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Since some folks seem interested in posting about it, here's a thread for it. See, I'll even put up some background on the key players who are having a battle royal behind the scenes, because it's been interesting to follow in an occasional sort of way:

1) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader (highest ranking official; appointed, can be deposed) for the last two decades. Knowledgeable about Koranic law, puritanical, virtuous, lacks charisma. His power lies in his position, not himself. Some say that by having supported his ally Ahmadinejad so openly in recent weeks, he's lost a lot of clerical support needed to hold onto power.

2) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: radical right populist who won the presidency in 2005 by portraying himself as the countryside farmer's champion against the corrupt insiders. His constituency is largely rural and very conservative, but most of Iran is largely rural and very conservative, once you get outside the main cities. He's an ultra-nationalist with strong ties to Khamenei, whom he seemingly reveres.

3) Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister. He's being portrayed in the West as Our Darling, but until recently he was as hardline and radical as Ahmadinejad, only without the foot-in-mouth disease. Smarter than Ahmadinejad, but no reformer. Still intensely distrusts the west, but more nuanced in his approach. Ruthless, intelligent, patient, practical. Has much support in urban areas.

4) Mohammed Khatami. This one's a two term president who won a landslide victory in 1997 as a reformer. Unfortunately for him, the Supreme Leader cracked down on his reforms. Playing a role behind the scenes, attempting to bring about reforms, but distrusted by some of the leading players.

5) Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani. Big gun: one of Iran's richest figures, a former speaker of parliament and two-term president, current head of the Assembly of Experts, the appointed group that could, if enough of them agree, remove Khamenei. There have been numerous allegations of corruption, but nothing proven. As it happens, Rafsanjani and Khamenei have a longstanding feud and personally loathe one another.

6) Mehdi Karroubi, a former parliament speaker. This is the guy who's the real reformer candidate in the last election, and was running a distant third in the polls. He's very popular in his home province, however, and among students. Has very limited power on his own, but could prove potentially useful in the current behind the scenes maneuvering.

7) Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri. Though the Western media doesn't care to mention it, he has greater religious authority than Khamenei. He was also one of the first Iranian elite to announce the election results as fraudulent. He wants limited separation of powers among sacred and secular branches, and has called for several days of mourning for those killed in Teheran's street protests.

8) Ali Larijani is the current parliament speaker. He's the consummate insider who always manages to land on his feet. Considered close to Khamenei, but doesn't like Ahmadinejad, who has tried to curtail parliamentary power.

9) Major General Mohammed Ali Jafari. He leads the 300,000 strong Revolutionary Guard, which is the nerve center of Iran's security. He's the one who's been taking orders for the first peaceful, then violent suppression of protests. The US has his organization on its terrorist list, but he reports directly to the Supreme Leader. He runs a flourishing business empire in Iran. Might be interested in expanding that abroad, don't you know?

10) Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. This guy's the radical head of the Guardian Council, and a very close ally of Ahmadinejad. As it happens, he's also in charge of looking into election fraud. Not a good combination. A narrow-minded extremist, a sort of Iranian neo-con.

With characters like this, there's a good novel of intrigue and power hidden somewhere.

A few things unite the whole lot.

They all want nuclear power as a deterrent against potential Israeli and US attacks, and as a means of supplying energy to their people.

They all want a carefully controlled economy.

They all really, really distrust the West, just as most Iranians by and large really, really distrust the West. And for the same reasons: external exploitation, regime toppling, and manipulation of domestic affairs.

Behind the bellicose public rhetoric, most of them are a lot smarter than the media makes them appear. They were almost all trained in a legalist tradition, and they rose through the ranks by intelligence, not thuggery. In the field of intellectual battle they could eat the likes of Sarkozy, Brown, and McCain for lunch. Obama might give them indigestion, but he's being carved up by his friends and enemies at home.

Have at it, if you want to: the election, the protests, the big doings behind it all. Enjoy. Let's see if anything gets posted.

Well, if the topic is so big, I won't be surprised if not a lot gets posted, especially considering the protests are dying down as the Basij have been ruthlessly cracking down on civilians. However, there's still a few factors that will destabilize the country. The fact that the protests exposed some cracks in the ruling clerics (Rafsanjani against Khamenei, in particular) isn't a problem that will just go away.

Also, some of the protesters that were killed have begun to be described as martyrs, which does present figureheads other than just Mousavi for the protesters. The death of Neda Agha-Soltan in particular was caught on video, and mourning days are supposed to be 4, 7, and 40 days afterward. ([url="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/haunting-video-turns-a-woman-into-a-martyr-and-a-movement-into-a-revolution/article1194437/"]This is the source[/url]) The Iranian government is trying to spread the lie that she was killed by protesters and not the military, but I doubt many people believe that.

Otherwise, on the general topic, the elections were clearly rigged, though even if they hadn't been, Ahmadinejad would have possibly still won. The fact that there were more votes than people counted in some regions (1000 votes per population of 700, for example) is a blatant clue, but naturally, no recount or actual investigation will take place since Ahmadinejad is Khamenei's man (unless the public really turns against both).

The protests never really had a chance of changing much, since the Revolutionary Guard supported the government.

There's been a lot of coverage about Obama's (lack of) response, particularly from right-wing media. Personally, as someone with a degree in International Relations, I think Obama did the best he could've done in a bad position. There's very little he could have accomplished with sterner and more vitriolic language, and it would've probably made the situation worse. He's a pragmatist, and actually thought before he spoke, something that Bush would've never done. He's also the principle "enemy" figure for the Iranian government, and if they can fully paint the protests as US-backed, they would've lost steam before they did. As Obama carefully worded his responses and stayed out of it, the protests were a domestic issue, which is a lot more troubling for the regime. I was rather disappointed in McCain's response, as he always seemed like a rather smart, internationally-minded guy. His response to this (and his bone-head comments a few months back about how the 9/11 terrorists came through Canada) has wiped away any respect I had for him.

On a side note, [url="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/globe-freelancer-detained-beaten/article1181792/"]this is a good story[/url] about a Western journalist that was detained in the first few days after the election. Its pretty chilling stuff.

Well, if the topic is so big, I won't be surprised if not a lot gets posted,

I'd suggest that leaves a lot of wiggle room for discussion in various areas. The conflicts in the streets. The chess battle behind the scenes. Iranian treatment by the Western media. Theocratic rule and structure in Iran. Mixed sacred and secular societies. The probable fallout of the election over the next several months.

therwise, on the general topic, the elections were clearly rigged, though even if they hadn't been, Ahmadinejad would have possibly still won.

I think that's a fair statement. Most Western analysis of the election simply quotes a study edited by Professor Ali Ansari, of the Institute of Iranian Studies at the University of St Andrews and of the London think tank Chatham House, that wanted to know why and how Ahmadinejad got 17 million votes in 2005 and got 24 million this year. But they overlook, as Flynt Leverett of the New American Foundation pointed out, that the 17 million figure only came from the first round of the 2005 numbers. When the second round of voting took place, Ahmadinejad had far more robust numbers.

That said, it's clear some people at the top weren't happy to settle for him winning by decent numbers. They wanted a fantastic win, so they crudely created insultingly false numbers. In retrospect, they could have had what they wanted if they'd just accepted a modest victory--but they didn't, and that's ironic. My guess is that this group lacked anyone with real finesse, and that once the decision was made to cook the results they were under a time crunch. But of course, this is all speculation.

I was rather disappointed in McCain's response, as he always seemed like a rather smart, internationally-minded guy. His response to this (and his bone-head comments a few months back about how the 9/11 terrorists came through Canada) has wiped away any respect I had for him.

McCain? I haven't expected better from him over the last several years. He's playing himself up as one of the neo-con's yap dogs, in the hope of getting nominated again in 2012 for the presidency. He's reversed his core principles so often in public that he's an embarrassment. The only bright thing he did--at least, for most of the last election cycle--was have the DC insiders riding with him in his touring bus, where he always fed them well and was available for questions. Consequently, almost no one ever asked him why he was constantly changing his stories before the camera, sometimes on a day to day basis.

The protests never really had a chance of changing much, since the Revolutionary Guard supported the government.

None at all. The problem is that at the same time, following Khamenei's Friday speech, it's taken the benevolent, non-partisan mask away from the Supreme Leader. He now looks like a rigid dictator, and that's not something either the rest of the big players or the urban public are going to enjoy.

fable wrote: None at all. The problem is that at the same time, following Khamenei's Friday speech, it's taken the benevolent, non-partisan mask away from the Supreme Leader. He now looks like a rigid dictator, and that's not something either the rest of the big players or the urban public are going to enjoy.

I fully agree, and it's probably why these protests, while unsuccessful, might have some lasting repercussions against the Supreme Leader and the President. Khamenei seems like a corrupt dictator to everyone now, and no one will ever believe that there is any semblance of democracy in Iran or legitimacy to Ahmadinejad.

Though he's an nutcase, Ahmadinejad could at least argue before that he was democratically elected by the majority of the people, and spoke for them. No one outside of Iran will believe this now after his fabricated election.

Very good opening post, Fable, thank you for that. It should be noted at this stage, that the protests in Iran and from Iranians worldwide, are not because people believe it would make a major difference for society's structure who won the election. Ayatollah Khamenei and the priesthood still rules the nation, and all candidates have their support - of course, otherwise they would not have been allowed to candidate. The protests are because the election was obviously rigged, and all the debates and election processes were just a charade.

The clerics are running the country, and there is nothing more motivating than fear of change.

DaveO wrote:The clerics are running the country, and there is nothing more motivating than fear of change.

When the Republicans held their last national convention, more than 1000 peaceful protesters were arrested, detained, and charged. Recently, 1200+ protesters arrested several years ago in NYC were declared illegal by the state courts, and all those concerned received pretty extensive damages. While we can say the system is operating moderately well for many USians, what does the fact that so many people must be arrested while peacefully protesting say about "fear of change" in a secular nation? I think what we see in Iran isn't the reaction of clerics, but the reaction of just about anyone in power to the possibility of losing it and probably never regaining it.

I think we need to bear in mind, too, that whatever comes out of Iran, the result will be another Islamic regime run by clerics: possibly more nuanced in its dealings with the West (Mousavi), maybe even with slight reformist tendencies (some combination of Rafsanjani, Karroubi, and/or Montazeri), but still clerical at its base. "Sacred" governments are no different from secular ones in most respects. We're just too used to thinking in terms of the RCC and Calvin--and above all, Augustine and his damn desire to create "The City of God on earth"--to see any alternative way that a non-secular regime could operate.

I'm not saying this is desirable. From a personal viewpoint, I certainly don't think so. And the deleterious effects on scientific research and education would be obvious. But in a larger perspective, I don't think we should assume Iran's regime will assume a set of actions based on Western clerical governments in history. We're out of our depth, here.

Thanks for the review, Fable.

Every single government is corrupt: politicians are corrupt by definition. The question is who is more pragmatic. I agree that "Islamic Republic" is different on many levels and Western diplomacy consistently fails due to the lack of fundamental understanding of this fact.

I have not followed the elections closely but I am under impression that it does not really matter which faction wins. They are all the same.
Actually, any radical political change (assuming this practically non-existent possibility) can destabilize the region significantly.

It's not the first time the youngsters are stirred by ambitious politicians and ayatollahs, and not the last. Their so-called Islamic revolution was also carried out by the easily manipulated youngsters. Youthful idealism and such, shamelessly exploited.

A bit of an update:

AP's reporting that Mousavi is now applying for a permit to authorize a Teheran demonstration one week in advance. He complained that Ahmadinejad's supporters are allowed to demonstrate without permits, though the authorities might understandably be more worried about very large groups angry with the political status quo than relatively small group cheering it on. In other words, while following due process he's grandstanding for the foreign media, who are eating it up. What a guy.

On the other hand, Ayatollah Jannati's group has examined a number of ballot boxes and found no evidence of fraud. Not slight evidence; no evidence. So he's accepting that larger numbers of people voted for Ahmadinejad than the extant voting population, and that voting distribution for the three main candidates was precisely even across all provinces. It's untenable, and has the effect of really boxing in Khamenei, who had previously stated the election results were probably flawed, but not sufficiently to change the outcome. One has to question Jannati's motives. Is he seeking to topple Khamenei from the "radical right/literalist" side, while Rafsanjani does it as a member of the new guard? Does he want to replace Khamenei as the controller-in-part of Ahmadinejad? Does he believe the regime is best served by maintaining an obviously false line, because it is held from the top? Regardless, this is bound to ratchet up tension.

Meanwhile, there's a little evidence that Mousavi's following may be getting away from him. Grassroots protestors have circulated a message via blogs and in public calling for peaceful but large gatherings in marketplaces today at 9 AM. Here's what's being sent out:

"If [the authorities] try to prevent us from doing this, they will inevitably close down the bazaar. If they don't prevent it, we will gather in such numbers that anyway the bazaar will be closed."

They're urging people to go as regular shoppers without identifying green bands, etc, wait until they have sufficient numbers, then just hang around buying nothing, and preventing easy access to services.

This is a rather strikingly ingenious cultural adaptation of Gandhi's passive protest theory. Because the traditional Iranian marketplace is similar to the European late medieval kind (and in fact gave birth to it, via the Crusades)--lots of narrow, labyrinthian corridors--it would be simple to block access. It would also be relatively simple to slip away if need be, and difficult for any armed force to counter en masse. If it succeeds, the marketplace closes down. If it fails, the merchants, who don't like gunplay near their stores, will still shut things down. And the marketplace is the heart of both small communities, and the communities-within-larger-communities of big cities.

None of this means "the people" are getting "democracy," of course. It may temporarily strengthen Mousavi's hand if the strategy works, but even if manages a coalition that places him in power, Mousavi is a conservative with no interest in structural changes. If it fails, Mousavi will be weakened, but it's hard to see a brutal crackdown throughout the smaller towns of Iran being helpful to Khamenei. The protesters get nothing either way, except the brief emotional thrill that comes from replacing an old set of ideologues with a slighter younger set of ideologues. But a Mousavi/Rafsanjani government may be able to eventually after a long time come to terms with the likes of Obama, where an Ahmadinejad/Khamenei government facing Bush certainly could not. It's the small difference between being mostly dead and slightly alive, but still--on rare occasions, as we know, that works.

Interesting times.

fable wrote: On the other hand, Ayatollah Jannati's group has examined a number of ballot boxes and found no evidence of fraud. Not slight evidence; no evidence. So he's accepting that larger numbers of people voted for Ahmadinejad than the extant voting population, and that voting distribution for the three main candidates was precisely even across all provinces. It's untenable, and has the effect of really boxing in Khamenei, who had previously stated the election results were probably flawed, but not sufficiently to change the outcome. One has to question Jannati's motives. Is he seeking to topple Khamenei from the "radical right/literalist" side, while Rafsanjani does it as a member of the new guard? Does he want to replace Khamenei as the controller-in-part of Ahmadinejad? Does he believe the regime is best served by maintaining an obviously false line, because it is held from the top? Regardless, this is bound to ratchet up tension.

Really, it's just a growing sign of how this situation has made Khamenei quite vulnerable. The election and the protests (and his utter support of Ahmadinejad) have made him less a "Supreme Leader that's above it all" and seeming more like the dictator-in-charge that he really is. Rather then Ahmadinejad being the sole focus of the protests, they're now just as much against Khamenei and his regime. By being one the players now, he's severely weakened his position to the point that the other clerics are now trying to see just how far they can push the whole mess to claim as much power as they can.

None of this means "the people" are getting "democracy," of course. It may temporarily strengthen Mousavi's hand if the strategy works, but even if manages a coalition that places him in power, Mousavi is a conservative with no interest in structural changes. If it fails, Mousavi will be weakened, but it's hard to see a brutal crackdown throughout the smaller towns of Iran being helpful to Khamenei. The protesters get nothing either way, except the brief emotional thrill that comes from replacing an old set of ideologues with a slighter younger set of ideologues.

Pretty much. Even if different kinds of protests were to be more disruptive and more difficult to crack down upon, its extremely unlikely that any kind of political change will come directly from it. But, if it destabilizes the regime somewhat, its just more cracks and variables in the Iranian political system. Baby steps...

But a Mousavi/Rafsanjani government may be able to eventually after a long time come to terms with the likes of Obama, where an Ahmadinejad/Khamenei government facing Bush certainly could not. It's the small difference between being mostly dead and slightly alive, but still--on rare occasions, as we know, that works.

Agree completely. They really won't be all that different, but it opens up the possibility for dialogue and negotiations that aren't completely governed by the mad posturing that has characterized Ahmadinejad. Additionally, while they're conservative, they're also a good deal more liberal towards women's rights. And if women in Iran get more rights and a more public role, some things are bound to change. Baby steps...

Interesting times.

Absolutely.

I just read this piece in the NYT... thought I'd post it here rather than starting a new thread:

[url="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/04/world/middleeast/04iran.html?partner=rss&emc=rss"]Iran Cleric Says British Embassy Staff to Stand Trial[/url]

PARIS — Brushing aside British and European efforts to seek the release of local British Embassy staff members held in Tehran, the Iranian authorities indicated Friday that they planned to put some of them on trial — a move that deepened a diplomatic crisis and could provoke the withdrawal of ambassadors.

In London, the Foreign Office said it was urgently checking reports that the Iranian authorities planned to put two of its local employees on trial. Nine staff members were seized after the unrest sparked by Iran’s disputed presidential elections on June 12.

Hours after the Iranian threat, the European Union seemed to hold back from an out-and-out showdown, resolving to summon Iranian ambassadors in all 27 countries to send “a strong message of protest against the detention of British Embassy local staff and to demand their immediate release,” said a European diplomat who, following European Union rules, spoke on condition of anonymity.

Other measures — such as a ban on issuing visas to Iranian travelers and a pullout of European ambassadors — would be considered depending on how the crisis unfolded, the diplomat said.

The Iranian authorities accused the local employees of fomenting and orchestrating protests, but pro-democracy Iranians ascribed the violence on the streets to a widespread crackdown by government security forces.







You can read the rest by clicking on the title.

The old 'unify the country by pointing fingers at the mutual enemy' ploy, usually works, especially when the mutual enemy is the one that's screwed around with your country more than any other. Unifying any country in the world, especially in the Middle East is easy if you can find some way of dragging the UK into affairs, justified or not. Even if the UK is innocent on this occasion, we've been guilty so many times in the past any accusations are bound to be credible.

Interesting story at the New York Times: "The most important group of religious leaders in Iran has called the disputed presidential election and the new government illegitimate, the most public sign of a major split in the country's clerical establishment." If this is true (and I don't doubt something happened; only that it could be interpreted incorrectly by outsiders, or be a false plant), then it shows the war in government circles still continuing. I've been suggesting that all along this is where the real contest was taking place, between conservative ideologues and conservative pragmatists. Of course, new winners might be a spectrum of political insiders who have made common cause to topple Khamenei and Ahmadinejad-or even some of their second tier allies.

You can read the article [url=http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/world/middleeast/05iran.html[/url]here[/url], but you will need to sign up (free) to the NY TImes to do so.

Interesting, but by no means completely unexpected:

Over the past week and a half, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has lost over half his cabinet (twelve out of twenty-one original appointees) as well as the support of many of his conservative allies, most notably the Islamic Republic's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Ahmadinejad's recent difficulties began after a rare letter of condemnation from the Supreme Leader was read on national television and forced Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie - Ahmadinejad's nominee for vice president - to resign.

Mashaie's resignation appears to reflect a rift within Iran's conservative leadership. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami (not to be confused with former reformist president Mohammad Khatami), was outraged by the appointment, saying it "will test Ahmadinejad's loyalty to the supreme leader.'' Meanwhile, ABC News notes that the president received a letter from 200 members of Iran's majlis (parliament), more than two-thirds of the body, asking that he "correct his behavior [and] follow the leader's opinion seriously."

It's from an article you can read on the Washington Note, here. Curiously, Ahmadinejad dared to reappoint his VP who resigned as chief-of-state. In other words, he's giving the finger to the conservative elite that has split over his presidency, and wanted a sign of his subservience to their will. Ahmadinejad being Ahmadinejad, he just couldn't let that challenge go by, although he owes that very presidency to the same people he just gave the finger to.

The question is how long he can retain his position. I suspect he could have managed matters much less clumsily and kept most of his power. As it is, he's the proverbial bull charging around in an extremely sophisticated china shop of Persian politics, some of the masters at the diplomatic game--and he hasn't a clue.

Would that be the VP who dared to say: "Iran wants no war with any country, and today Iran is friend of the United States and even Israel.... Our achievements belong to the whole world and should be used for expanding love and peace"?

galraen wrote:Would that be the VP who dared to say: "Iran wants no war with any country, and today Iran is friend of the United States and even Israel.... Our achievements belong to the whole world and should be used for expanding love and peace"?

I haven't heard any words like that out of the mouth of an Iranian politician since the dictator and puppet Shah was in power.

Ain't making it up honest. I know this is from Fox, and neither of us have time for that mob, but it was broadcast elsewhere too.

Of course context and previous statements from the same source have to be taken into account, and I certainly have no faith that the words actually mean anything, but hey, we can hope can't we?

galraen wrote:Ain't making it up honest. I know this is from Fox, and neither of us have time for that mob, but it was broadcast elsewhere too.

Of course context and previous statements from the same source have to be taken into account, and I certainly have no faith that the words actually mean anything, but hey, we can hope can't we?

If it's truly Marshaie, then I can only assume he's engaging in a desperate bid to gain the support of clerical moderates and conservatives who want less friction with the broadly defined "West." But this flies in the face of Ahmadinejad, who has played the hate/fear Israel/US card to his largely rural constituency very successfully and often. Which could mean that if Marshaie said it, it indicates Ahmadinejad is pulling in his horns, since Marshaie is his client.

Which will only make Ahmadinejad look even less principled and more cynical, if possible, to urban Iranians than he has before. Not that he cares. He craves power, and his power base is far from the big cities.

Interesting times.