Malta Soron wrote:Hmm... So the actions of the government (in particular war) can positively influence the protein intake of their subjects? Sounds obvious to me.
Yet you earlier wrote:
I don't quite see how the political structure would influence the level of protein intake.
...and that's what I was addressing. It also contradicts what you just wrote. For the sake of discussion, which of these two answers of yours best describes your current point of view?
However, this doesn't show how one type of government would be better at this than another. Even more, you examples contain numerous types of governments (tribes, medieval monarchs, city states, absolutist rulers, etc.) who all do the same thing.
I can see where you might have thought from my comments above that I was using a strict feudal/non-feudal dichotomy:
The key is "Northwestern Europe." This is a reflection upon an area with a notably high level of protein intake at a time when they enjoyed a largely non-feudal structure, unlike most of the rest of Europe. I see them as an exception, not the norm, and significantly, Steckel does not mention the feudal and largely agrarian, grain-oriented cultures of what were then the nations occuplying France, Italy, etc.
...but note, I only mentioned feudalism as one element, and continued with grain-oriented (agrarian) cultures as a second element. I would go further since the question has been narrowed, and suggest that a host of factors interacting with one another affect the amount of protein intake in the cultural diet. Temperature, rainfall, soil quality, government structure, international trade, infrastructure, national stability, rule of law--these can all have a number of interesting, localized effects.
Let's go back to feudalism. Herds were wealth, and in many smaller monarchies (read, large tribes) the king/tribal chieftain had ownership of it all, or imposed a tax depending on the size of the herd. As the king was also the center of law, these taxes could become onerous at times, and there was in any case no recourse from it. This also applies to land. The king took possession of all "unowned" land, which included nearly all forested land not owned by nobles, and refused hunting permission to all but his friends. This was often vigorously enforced. Individual herds were deemphasized by farmers, and poaching, while possible, became very dangerous. Farmers in much of feudal Europe emphasized grain.
In non-feudal Scandanavian monarchies, ownership of the herd remained with the herdsman. A king could still impose taxes, but if they became burdensome, there was recourse through the legal entity of the Thing to appeal. There are many records in which Things gave judgments against either the monarch or his representatives. So the desire of the wealthier, more powerful classes to gain still more wealth was guarded against by a notion of the bonders, the freemen class, as the repositories of collective national will. One good source for this is Fletcher Pratt's The Third King, mainly a study of the period of Valdemar IV, but there are others, as well.
This example should not be taken to mean I intend it as a universal solution. There were many different situations all over Europe, but this is one that was repeatedly encountered in European feudal societies of the period.